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The Effect of Corporatism on
Contemporary Public Attitudes to Welfare
MICHAEL WEARING

University of New South Wales
Sidney, Australia

This article examines evidence for the possible link between public support for increased spending on government welfare programs and the
strength of government welfare intervention in six OECD countries;
Austria, Germany, Britain, the USA, Australia and Italy. Data is used
from a 1985 international survey to question the congruence between
the public's support for state welfare and the degree of corporatism
as an indicator of state intervention in these countries. The concept
of corporatism is limited to an analytic device that indicates the form
of state intervention and policy making in particularhistorical periods
and within sectors of state activity. The argument that state welfare action is directly constrainedby public attitudes to welfare-the 'popular
constraints' thesis-is questioned using this data. Other possible explanations for the lack of congruence between mass preferences and state
welfare provision are also examined.

While research into contemporary popular attitudes to the
state welfare system has increased in technical sophistication,
the level of theoretical development has been somewhat lacking.
It is no longer accurate to write, as others have (Myrdal 1960,
Wilensky 1975, Coughlin 1979), that there is an acceptance of
welfare measures in public opinion across all welfare states.
Yet, recent debates on the nature of welfare state development
continue to base arguments about the implementation of welfare
intervention on the climate of opinion amongst citizens. In the
most recent debates in Australia and elsewhere, an association
is made between public opinion and the adequacy of coverage
of public welfare measures. The argument contends that there is
direct correspondence between public attitudes toward welfare
and the levels and forms of public welfare spending in advanced
welfare states.
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Corporatism is broadly defined for the analysis below as
those bipartite and tripartite contractual arrangements amongst
business, the state and trade unions that lead to consensus
building over social and economic policy. Corporatism is used
below as a descriptive construct that indicates certain developments in the state welfare sector and not as a prescription
for the political development of welfare policy. To use the term
prescriptively would over-emphasise, as others have done
(Wilensky 1981), the strategic value of corporatist theory. Strong
corporatism usually means highly centralised state regulation of
social and economic life. A further aspect to corporatist analysis emphasised by Cawson (1986, 1988) is the creation of policy
at the meso-corporatist level from bipartite and tripartite arrangements, say between welfare lobby groups and the state,
or amongst professional groups, the state and unions. Some implications of this broad definition for the relationship between
state activity and welfare policy are included in the analysis
below.
In Australia there have been repeated claims that public or
community attitudes somehow retard or constrain the development of the Australian welfare state. Gruen (1989:2), for example, has claimed recently that 'in probing the public mind
one is trying to characterise a range of sentiments that serve as
political constraints for policy makers'. Gruen then goes on to
link, or at least suggest a link between, changing mass attitudes
to government spending and the political constraints over time
on Australian welfare policies created by these attitudes. Similar arguments on the constraints of state action are evident in
empirical research in Britain. Taylor-Gooby (1988:13) offers one
example, when he suggests that 'over the period since 1979 the
policy of constraint in welfare spending has been tailored by
the pattern of public support'.
Accounts of the historical development of Scandinavian
countries (Esping-Andersen 1985) and the United States (Heclo
1985) contend that their welfare cultures, especially amongst
the working class, are particularly significant in the development of welfare provision. Esping-Andersen (1985:88) has argued, for example, that the Nordic Social Democracies have a
"well-organized and politically articulate peasantry committed
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to democracy". This argument implies that the mass loyalty
or support of the organized working class (unions and labour
parties) is of major significance in the determination of welfare
effort in any advanced democracies. A sophisticated theoretical
position on the relationship between mass opinion and welfare intervention is provided by Habermas's (1973:5-6) mass
preference or loyalty thesis. This thesis argues that the politicaladministrative system is legitimated by the "mass loyalty" of
the socio-cultural system in late capitalist societies. What is at
question is how "mass loyalty" is constituted? Is loyalty represented simply by voting behaviour or other indicators of public opinion? A more fundamental question is how loyalty to
social welfare provisions is distributed amongst social groups
and whose loyalty is privileged in the polity of late capitalist
societies?
Strong empirical accounts have dealt more thoroughly with
this relationship between public opinion and welfare policy
(Coughlin 1979, Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby 1987a, 1987b, Papadakis 1990a, 1990b). These studies provide plausible explanations for congruence and incongruence in the relationship
based either on international economic trends (Coughlin 1979)
or Hirschman's influential concepts of exit, voice and loyalty
(Klein 1976, Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby 1987a, Taylor-Gooby
1988, Papadakis 1990a, 1990b). It has been noted, however, that
such explanations, especially the latter, equate public opinion
or the opinions of specific groups with the likelihood of taking
action on those opinions (Smith and Wearing 1990:10). Without
further study of the relationship between group action and welfare policy it cannot be claimed that investigation of the effects
of public opinion on welfare will tell us anything about "some
of the constraints on policy makers" (Papadakis 1990b:1).
It is likely that there is an equally weak empirical association between opinions and action on welfare policy as there
is between opinions and social location as measured by indicators of social class or occupational status. The latter association is a finding of Papadakis's most recent study of attitudes
to welfare in Australia (Papadakis 1990b:126). As argued elsewhere (Smith and Wearing, 1987, 1990), Australian and international evidence suggest that conditions for the development
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of welfare cultures remain at a disjuncture to mass preferences
in advanced welfare states. Whether they are economic models of "public demand" or the "popular constraints" models,
explanations of public opinion's effect on welfare policy have
clearly neglected the lack of empirical connection between opinion and policy developments (contra Papadakis 1990a:224). This
criticism of studies notwithstanding, research on empirical insights into opinions amongst various groupings in relation to
specific welfare measures has developed the domain of political explanation for constraints on policy.
A similar "popular constraints" thesis on the development
of welfare policy has developed from a social democratic position in line with those claims made above on public constraints
of state welfare. A common theme in contemporary social democratic writing (see Wilensky 1981a:189, Mishra 1984:32) on social
policy suggests that social welfare policies organised around a
national political (party and administrative) strategies of corporation are more likely to gain support from public opinion than
other forms of national political organisation of social welfare
provisions. Democratic corporatism is a form of corporatism
that is generally open to the pressure of public opinion. It is
designed to enhance citizens' support for and consensus over
the public legitimacy of advanced welfare states and, thus, to
counter sources of popular pressure against social democratic
reform. In this process corporatist agreements by-pass normal
parliamentary debate and channels of political and social contract. Further, recent comparisons show that there is a significant
positive association between the level of spending in advanced
welfare states and the degree of corporatism (O'Connor and
Bryan 1988:54-59).
The main argument of this paper is that state social and
economic policies, especially public welfare policies, are not
constrained by the mass preference of citizens in the countries
examined. The paper further argues that the pro-corporatist
stance of current social democratic thinking which assumes public opinion constraints state welfare intervention has little, if
any, empirical validity. There is very little comparative evidence
for congruence or correspondence between public perception
and the form of actual welfare policies (of Smith and Wearing
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1990). The aim of this article is to use comparative evidence
on public opinion to assess the impact of corporatism on welfare culture in the development of welfare policies. The range
of welfare provisions assessed is limited to public or state welfare activity in the areas of education, health, unemployment,
unemployment benefits and aged pensions.
The method adopted is an assessment of the relative degree of corporatism in advanced welfare states. Survey evidence
from the 1985 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)
that includes items on public attitudes to welfare spending and
provision is used to gauge the effects of corporatism on welfare
cultures (random samples were taken for the survey; sample
size for each country is given in Tables 1, 2, and 3). It is acknowledged in this method that different factors may be necessary in
time and across countries to provide adequate explanations for
the development of different forms and types of welfare states.
Corporatism and Welfare Culture
What effect have corporatist tendencies had on the welfare
cultures of advanced welfare states? If we focus on similarities amongst the provisions of welfare states, then a concept
of corporatism offers a way of understanding the consistencies
in welfare state developments across nations. At a comparative level, the problem might well be "how and when corporatism matters" and not merely a corporatism that correlates
with periods of social democratic governance (Shalev 1983: 350).
Corporatism is one general concept amongst many that may
be used to understand similarities in the comparative analysis
of welfare expenditure and provision. The problem with this
focus is that comparative difference such as in political systems, country-specific historical circumstances and the socioeconomic environment can be either ignored or obscured. A
multi-dimensional approach to comparative analysis that includes theoretically informed analysis and a diversity of social and political factors should illuminate areas of welfare state
development.
Social democratic traditions of welfare are difficult to define
under categories of party politics in the United States-liberal
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and conservative, Democratic and Republican. Usually the term
"social democrat" is associated with a liberal-left perspective on
social and economic reforms. These reforms are based on the
mobilization of working class interests in the development of
the welfare state (Castles 1985:1-9). Corporatist theory confuses
the left/liberal versus right/conservative dichotomy by adding
a third dimension. Corporatism is seen to develop either under
the political conditions of pluralism (Wilensky 1981a, 1981b) or
conditions of class conflict (Gould 1982, Panitch 1986, Rothstein
1987). Hybrid versions of these two positions tend to conceive
corporatism as a regulatory function of state action that is negotiated or bargained for by "group representatives" (Offe 1984)
who in turn stand-in-for or represent relations amongst the three
dominant political actors-capital, labour and the state (Cawson 1986).
An empirical focus on the opinions of group representatives
assumes a certain correspondence between their opinions and
the stringency or generosity of social welfare provision. In this
paper public support for social welfare is assessed in several
countries to evaluate the impact of corporatism on public attitudes to state welfare. This is an exploration of the general
effects of corporatist tendencies on public attitudes to welfare.
Corporatism has not featured as a part of policy and political debate in the 1980s in the United States as it has in several
other advanced industrial countries. The literature from Australia and the United Kingdom refer to 'peak associations' such
as the Business Roundtable or key organisations in the securities industry whose interests cut across industries and sectors as
examples of corporatist strategies in the United States (Stabler
1987: 278, Moran: 207). The American literature has described
Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States as 'the
least corporatist in their bargaining structure' (Wilensky and
Turner 1987: 14-15). The weak corporatism of these countries
leaves their political economics fragmented, decentralised and
open to interest group pressure-all characteristics of a pluralist polity. Some commentators contend that the New Deal of
the 1930s was a critical period for the establishment of limited
corporatism in the United States. According to Moran, state regulation of the securities industries in the United States from the

Welfare and Public Opinion

181

1930s to the 1980s illustrates the outcome of corporatist strategy. He argues that all Federal securities exchange legislation
over this period has augmented the authority and control of
the peak association, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(Moran 1987: 207-208).
As a working hypothesis, strong corporatist welfare states
should have more public support for welfare than weak corporatist welfare states. This hypothesis is questioned by the evidence presented. There is no indication in the data that weak
corporatist welfare states lack public support for more generous forms of socio-economic distribution by way of state welfare measures. The countries included in the analysis belowAustria, West Germany, Italy, Britain, America and Australiaare placed within the general categories of weak, medium or
strong corporatism. These are the categories suggested by Cawson's 1986 analysis. Such categories are contentious in that most
comparative policy analysts cannot agree on the strength of corporatism in modern states. Both Esping-Anderson (1991: 60-61,
70-71) and O'Connor and Bryan (1988:62) give slightly different
empirical classifications of countries in relation to corporatism
from Cawson. Nonetheless, Cawson's classification provides a
framework in which to demonstrate both limits to theories of
corporatism and counter arguments to congruence and popularist arguments on welfare development. This classification
is supported by Esping-Andersen's (1991:70-71) ranking of the
degree of corporatism in 18 welfare state regimes.
Support for Public Welfare Spending
What effect has corporatism had on public opinion towards
state welfare policies? In the early 1930s Tawney (1964) argued
that two arms of "the strategy of equality" had been promoted
in policies of social and economic redistribution in these countries. The first arm promoted universal social welfare policies
and, the second, the regulation of economic freedoms in the
market. This redistributive vision of social-democratic thinking
gained intellectual support in post-1945 arguments on the social
and economic benefits to citizens of welfare states. In the late
1950s, the Swedish social democrat, Myrdal (1960:121) argued
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that redistributive policies of the welfare state-social security,
public health, public housing, public education and progressive
taxation-had gained the support of national populations in advanced democracies.
More recently Le Grand (1982) has questioned this socialdemocratic vision with evidence from Britain that most social
welfare services except for income maintenance policies are not
redistributive. Other writers (Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby 1987)
also point to the "islands of privilege" of upper and middle class
groupings maintained through occupational as well as social
welfare measures in the British class structure. Such problems of
distribution were alluded to in Titmuss's (1958 [19551) essay on
the three-part divisions of fiscal-occupational and social welfare.
Similar hidden occupational mechanisms of distribution such
as non-wage employment benefits are also lacking in relation
to social policy debate on the Australian social wage (for an
exception see Graycar and Jamrozik 1989).
The contemporary critics of the redistributive potential of
the state welfare have undermined the "purity" of the political project of an original social-democratic strategy to promote
equality, a strategy that underlay government funded and delivered social welfare services (of Baldwin 1989). While this
intellectual vision for social welfare measures has been found
wanting, public support for such policies has not waned as the
following evidence will demonstrate. However, lack of public
support for the promotion of equality through fiscal-social welfare measures could threaten the possibility of social-democratic
reform to income and wealth distribution. The nature of reform would further depend on the form of political economy in
each welfare state. As others have recognised, political control
of the corporatist economy is a corporatist requirement for social democratic welfare (Shalev 1983:344, Esping-Andersen 1990:
Chapter 7). The extent to which this control is not achieved in
advanced welfare states reflects a misconception of how political constraints work in these countries.
Table 1 shows that national public support for government
to reduce income inequality was lowest amongst Australians
and Americans at the time of survey in 1983-84, and high in
Austria and West Germany (53.8 per cent and 38.5 per cent
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Table 1
Table 1: Public Support for Government's Responsibility to Reduce Income
Differences Between the Rich and Poor (percent)
(Total % = 100 N = 7350)
West
Australia Germany Britain USA Austria

Definitely
should be

Italy

24.4

27.7

47.9

17.5

41.2

46.9

29.4

39.7

26.7

21.0

36.8

37.2

26.4

25.3

14.3

26.6

16.4

10.2

19.9

7.3

11.1

34.9

5.7

5.6

(1528)

(1048)

(1530)

(677)

(987)

(1580)

Probably

should be
Probably should

not be
Definitely should
not be
Sample Size

Source: International Social Survey Programme; Role of Govemment-1985
(Germany)

in the former thought the government definitely or probably
should support reductions compared to 78 per cent and 77.4 per
cent in the latter). There is, nonetheless, high public support for
governments to reduce income differences in weak corporatist
countries such as Britain and Italy (74.6 per cent and 84.1 per
cent). This may indicate the mismatch between pro-corporatist
views on income redistributive policies and the high levels of
public support for a general policy of redistribution. Countries
such as Austria and West Germany are not the only countries
with high levels of public support for income redistribution.
Marklund (1988:77) argues that while public support for social
welfare is relatively high in Scandinavian countries compared to
other advanced welfare states, this support is declining. These
general levels of support can be tested against more specific
public support for state welfare provisions which may or may
not be perceived in public opinion as policies of redistribution.
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Table 2

Public Support for More or Less Government Expenditure on Education,
Health, Old Age Pensions and Unemployment Benefits (percent)
(Total % = 100

N = 7350)

West
Australia Germany Britain USA Austria Italy
Education (a)
Spend much more
Spend more
Spend the same
Spend less
Spend much less

21.9
42.1
32.0
3.3
0.8

9.6
30.5
52.9
6.0
1.0

22.9
51.9
23.3
1.8
0.2

21.3
43.1
31.0
3.9
0.8

8.9
27.4
55.0
7.8
0.9

17.0
46.8
32.4
3.5
0.3

Health (b)
Spend much more
Spend more
Spend the same
Spend less
Spend much less

21.4
41.1
31.0
4.0
1.6

19.1
33.2
40.5
6.6
0.6

35.5
52.5
11.2
0.5
0.3

13.0
45.0
34.3
6.1
1.7

22.2
38.2
37.7
1.5
0.4

32.2
46.9
14.2
5.3
1.4

Old Age Pensions (c)
Spend much more
Spend more
Spend the same
Spend less
Spend much less

17.3
37.7
40.9
3.3
0.8

10.6
35.8
49.7
3.3
0.6

25
50.1
23.7
1.1
0.1

12.6
31.0
42.4
11.2
2.8

12.6
38.1
47.4
1.5
0.4

21.7
53.5
20.5
3.6
0.7

Unemployment Benefits
Spend much more
Spend more
Spend the same
Spend less
Spend much less

(d)
3.7
8.9
35.5
30.1
21.8

7.9
26.8
52.1
10.5
2.7

11.9
29.1
39.7
14.9
4.2

8.0
18.4
49.1
17.0
7.5

3.2
11.9
43.8
30.8
10.4

14.9
40.8
26.6
10.9
6.8

(1528)

(1048)

Sample Size

(1530) (677)

(987) (1580)

Source: International Social Survey Programme; Role of Government-1
(Germany)
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Table 2 shows two consistent patterns in public support
for government expenditure on the specific state provisions of
education, health, aged pensions and unemployment benefits.
First, there is strong support for greater government expenditure on education, health and old age pensions in all six countries. These strong levels of support dispute the pro-corporatist
arguments of social democrats that weak corporatist welfare
states such as Australia, Britain, the USA and Italy do not have
the popular mandate to pursue policies of social and economic
redistribution. Social democratic thinking on the politics of welfare cultures has created a popularist fallacy. This fallacy is
that, somehow, these weak corporatist countries are more constrained by the public legitimacy of social welfare measures than
countries such as West Germany and Austria. The argument accepts a teleology that asserts mass public support or mass loyalty for certain social policies legitimates (by their input into
state planning) a specific constellation of welfare policy. The
functionalism in such views of state action in liberal democracies obscures the lack of choice citizens have in the limited
policy options made available to them by social welfare administrations, amongst other forms of administration.
Second, in the strong corporatism of countries such as West
Germany and Austria a consistent pattern emerges in public
opinion's levels of satisfaction with current government spending on the four areas. For these two countries there is greater
public support in most instances to "spend the same" across
these welfare provisions. This greater satisfaction with current
government spending on social welfare may be related to public perception that after two-to-three decades of high levels of
expenditure on social welfare programs, national well-being has
been adequately catered for. A survey of Austrian attitudes to
post-war welfare measures found that Austrians "showed themselves aware of the successful attempt to ensure full employment stability and social welfare" (Veselsky 1981:180). Lower
levels of support for increases in such countries may be a reflection of this success. It is plausible, however, that this expenditure addressed problems of socio-economic inequality in these
countries. Further, there are significant indications, whether by
design or default, that Scandinavian countries have had the
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most equitable policies in the post-war period (Stephens 1979,
Pampel and Williamson 1988).
A different set of arguments applies to government benefitsin-kind provided to specifically targeted populations. When the
public supports an increased role for government to provide for
specific groups such as the sick, the aged and the unemployed,
the degree of support for these groups can not only vary considerably across each country but also across each group within
a country. Table 3 shows that in America and Australia, as the
most extreme examples, nearly half of those surveyed (49.7 per
cent respectively) do not think the government is responsible
for providing a decent standard of living for the unemployed.
Further, while the provision of health care for the sick is seen
as a legitimate role for government provision, public support
for the creation of employment by government is not as strong.
Again, as with their opinions on policies targeted at the unemployed, Americans and Australians are least likely amongst
all the countries to support job-creation as a legitimate role for
government-65.3 per cent of Americans and 47.3 per cent of
Australians believed that 'jobs for all' either probably or definitely should not be the responsibility of government.
The findings on national attitudes towards select public welfare measures are two-fold. First, national populations are more
likely to support comprehensive systems of benefits such as free
universal education and health service than spending or provision for heavily stigmatised groups such as the unemployed or
sections of the aged population. In strongly corporatist countries, this stigma is presumably not as great. One administrative
factor that may influence the degree of stigmatisation in these
countries is the degree to which unemployment or aged benefits are tied too strong (Universalist) social insurance schemes
for all or most of their populations.
A discernible pattern on the social categorisation of welfare
beneficiaries is evident from this data. If a category of welfare
beneficiary (or their benefit) is associated with economic definitions of the causes of their circumstances (Eg lack of "work
effort") it is more likely that the public will adopt punitive
attitudes towards these welfare dependent groups. A similar
pattern of categorisation of beneficiaries is evident with some
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Table 3
National Support for Government's to Provide: Jobs for all; Health Care for
the Sick; and, a Decent Standard of Living for the Aged and the Unemployed
(percent)
(Total % = 100

N = 7350)

West
Australia Germany Britain USA Austria Italy
Jobs for all
Definitely should be
Probably should be
Probably should not be
Definitely should not be

20.2
32.6
29.1
18.2

35.5
46.0
15.7
2.8

38.0
33.9
16.6
11.6

13.7
21.0
33.6
31.7

46.8
37.5
12.9
2.7

50.5
38.5
7.6
3.3

Health Care
Definitely should be
Probably should be
Probably should not be
Definitely should not be

60.3
33.0
5.4
1.3

53.7
43.9
2.1
0.3

85.4
13.7
0.6
4.3

35.9
47.0
12.8
0.3

65.8
32.5
1.4
0.3

86.6
13.0
0.1

Provide for the Aged
Definitely should be
Probably should be
Probably should not be
Definitely should not be

62.4
33.7
3.3
0.6

55.8
40.9
2.9
0.4

78.3 40.8
20.1 47.0
1.2
9.6
0.4 2.6

64.3
34.2
1.3
0.1

81.6
17.8
6.0
0.1

Provide for the unemployed
Definitely should not be 15.1
Probably should be
43.9
Probably should not be
31.8
Definitely should not be
9.1

23.9
61.5
11.5
3.1

44.3
41.3
10.8
3.7

17.7
50.7
20.6
11.1

38.9
45.9
10.8
4.5

Sample Size

(1528)

(1048)

15.7
34.6
33.0
16.7

(1530) (677) (987) (1580)

Source: International Social Survey Programme: Role of Government-1985
(Germany).
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qualification in Australian public opinion. Chart 1 shows the
trends in Australian opinion polls that surveyed "causes of unemployment" from 1975 to 1990. Over the period 1986-90 the
category in these polls "people not wanting to work" was consistently high or the highest category of public opinion on the
causes of unemployment. As was the case with the mid-1970s,
this later period corresponds with a period of economic decline in Australia. The unemployed became scapegoats for economic recession in both periods. This evidence suggests that
Cawson's (1986:108) arguments on class collaboration at the
meso-corporatist level have some foundation especially within
a welfare sector faced with staffing and other economic cutbacks during the 1980s such as that in Australia. The stigmatisation of the unemployed diverts attention away from middle
class beneficiaries of social and occupational welfare in Australia (cf Gould 1981). The organisation of professional and administrative interests-white collar or middle class interests-to
the exclusion and victimisation of poor people such as the unemployed and single parents is a distinctive historical feature
of Australian social policy.
The second finding is that there is some variation across
countries not examined in the generalisation of the first finding.
In this regard the degree of corporatism may have some effect
on the level of satisfaction that exists for a government welfare
provision. This level of satisfaction appears unaffected by the
lack of strong support for an increase in the government's role to
provide for these groups. Highly interventionist and centralised
governments such as Austria appear to have only marginally
less support for their interventionist stance on specific welfare
groups than countries such as Britain and Italy.
Figure 1 is a typology of correspondence between the degree of satisfaction with welfare spending by governments developed from Table 2 and the degree of corporatism in each
welfare state. The relationships suggested in this typology indicates that the strength of corporatism is associated with existing
levels of provision in each country. This is not to say that these
welfare cultures lead to a greater role for government in the
provision of welfare than the other countries mentioned. Table 4 ranks ten countries, including the six mentioned, by their
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Chart 1
Public Perception of Causes of Unemployment in Australia 1975 to 1990
(%)
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Source: Morgan Gallup Polls 1975-1990, no poll was taken in 1981

levels of public social security spending. The spending on public social security in these countries shows there is not a perfect
correlation between ranks of levels of spending and the suggested degree of corporatism in such countries. If expenditure
on social security benefits is a good indicator of the degree of
corporatism in each country then America and Australia are the
lowest spenders with the lowest degree of corporatism and Austria and West Germany are the highest degree of corporatism
of the six countries included in the analysis. Nonetheless, the
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Figure 1

A Typology of Correspondence between the Degree of Public Satisfaction
with Welfare Spending and the Degree of Corporatism in each Welfare State

Degree of Corprotism
Weak
Degree of
Public
Satisfaction
with Welfare
Spending

Low

America
Australia

Middle

Britain
Italy

High

Meduim

Strong

West Germany

Austria

correlation between welfare spending and corporatism would
be weaker if welfare effort/spending was measured using a
combined set of indicators (as suggested by Gilbert and Maon
1988) rather than social security expenditures alone. Even
amongst English-Speaking countries the mix of social security
provisions is diverse and highly specialised for the conditions
of each country (Bolderson 1988). Such complexity in the measurement of welfare effort makes comparison of opinion and
corporatism problematic. In making these comparisons, however, the significance of the debate on corporatism and welfare
development is not denied.
Strong corporatist countries have the most redistributive social and economic policies of all advanced welfare states (Castles
1990). An emphasis on the success of other countries' policies in
promoting equality does not mean that such policies are translatable into the policy-context of weak corporatist countries. The
political danger in adopting policy ideas, say from the Swedish
social welfare system, are obvious: redistributive policies can
be developed out of their social and political context, the history of labour movements struggles and other arenas of political
struggle such as those over the right to vote, resource allocation
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and rights to social welfare are either neglected or ignored completely. Perhaps a more fruitful line of analysis of public support for redistributive measures would be to gauge the mood of
public attitude towards redistributive policies including social
welfare services in specific electoral regions. From this research,
opinions that inform voting behaviour on social policy might
be gauged in each country.
Beyond "Democratic" Corporatism
The general findings of this paper are not surprising. We
would expect a nation's public support for welfare spending to
show similar, albeit inconsistent patterns in each welfare state
dependent on the form of social provision. We would, however, probably not expect similar levels of support for distinct
provisions in the welfare cultures of both strong and weak
corporatist welfare states. This latter-finding runs contrary to
arguements that favour corporatist political organization. The
most notable assumptions challenged by these findings is that
either a strong welfare culture enhances generous welfare measures or the public good is served by a program of 'democratic'
corporatism. Democratic corporatism supposedly insulates state
administrations from popular pressure and, yet, remains open
to the pressures of the opinions of those who participate in
tripartite arrangements. The promise of this style of democratic
corporatism has little to offer as a strategy for capital-labour mediation. A strategy that supposedly retards those political "constraints" created by mass loyalty to policies of redistribution.
One problem with using corporatism as an analytic concept is its contested meaning in political analysis (Panitch 1986,
Cox 1988, Cawson 1988). According to Cox (1988: 294) the theory of corporatism is most useful when describing the political
form of the state in historical periods and not in understanding the policy process. Cawson disagrees with Cox in arguing
that corporatism can be used in tandem with other theories of
the state and policy formation to explain policy development
in a country. Theories of corporatism may provide some necessary evaluation and differentiation of policy development and
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policy closure in decision-making in various spheres of state,
business, union or welfare activity. The concept of corporatism
is not the only metaphor in modern political theory that stands
for forms of consensus politics or bargaining amongst interest
groups. Cawson's (1988:314) defence of the concept as a useful
tool in policy analysis seems to suggest otherwise. The rise of
the concept in political theory has meant that it has been uncritically integrated into studies of the state and, hence, studies
of welfare state development.
There are several speculative arguments that are relevant
to contemporary debate despite the eight year lapse since the
collection of this attitudinal data on welfare. Even if all public opinion could be controlled by governments, there is little
evidence to support the thesis that mass opinions or "mass
loyalty" makes any direct difference or contribution to social
policy-making in advanced welfare states (cf Smith and Wearing 1990). The pursuit of democratic corporatism embraces the
flawed political assumption that more direct public pressure on
welfare would bring a social democratic "strategy of equality"
undone. On the evidence of this paper such assumptions are
wrong in their original premise about the relationship between
political action and the level of state welfare intervention. At the
very least, in terms of state welfare activity, political constraints
do not equal 'popular constraints' no matter how we think a
liberal-democracy should be governed.
The general criticisms of corporatist theory are linked to this
paper's empirical critique of part of the democratic corporatist
thesis. Other writers (Bean 1991) have used the 1985 ISSP data to
describe the pattern of attitudes towards government programs
and expenditure. The analysis of this paper evaluates the empirical evidence to counter some normative arguments on the
role of corporatism in welfare development. In doing this, the
claim made is that certain political and social factors such as
corporatism contribute to the making of public opinion and are
generalisable for the purpose of comparative policy analysis (cf
Castles 1982a). Theories of corporatism provide limited explanations for both how welfare policies and services have developed
and why they develop in advanced welfare states. Corporatist
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theory explains a proportion of state policy development. The
theory does not explain all policy development. Furthermore,
it is doubtful whether the status of corporatism as a political
concept in modern political theory is deserved.
What are the implications of these conclusions for current
thinking on the comparative developments of welfare states?
The orthodox social democratic thesis on the relationship between public opinion and welfare-that constraints on redistribution policies are created by public opinion (Eg Wilensky
1981:189)-is discredited by the findings and analysis above.
More critical analysis of the relationship between state welfare
activity and public attitudes might look towards those social actors involved in the steering of state action that builds a picture
of consensus on national welfare. Recent evidence on the disjuncture between public opinion and actual policies of distribution and redistribution suggests the ideology of egalitarianism
has been preserved in the most conservative welfare states such
as America and Australia (Kolosi 1989). While in almost complete contradiction, these welfare states remain the least generous towards their populations and the least distributive with
wage income (cf Saunders and Hobbes 1989, Castles 1990).
Implications can be drawn from the findings for the development of the Australian welfare state in the 1990s. Since the
early 1970s the Australia welfare state has developed a number
of corporatist tendencies that have shifted government objectives towards economic productivity and restrained public finance commitments (Encel 1979, Head 1989). On the one hand,
this position justifies the general category of Australia as a weak
corporatist welfare state (Stewart 1985). On the other, the position does not necessarily justify an interest group approach such
as that adopted by Cawson on how corporatism works. The interest group or pluralist position that often develops together
with arguments on corporatism may be of limited value in analysis of the Australian situation (cf Loveday 1984). A more critical approach to the current Australian federal political system
could be categorised as 'pseudo-corporatist'-a system where
partners can opt out of tripartite or, at other policy levels, bipartite agreements.
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Conclusion
No doubt tighter and more stringent discipline of the work
force can be imposed under strong macro-corporatism to encourage a nation's economic productivity and at a micro economic level the efficiency of private firms. This does not mean,
as Offe (1984:250) points out, that all partners in national social contracts are subject to the same degree of regulation over
their distributions of assets and their economic privileges. The
scenario of a form of 'pseudo-corporatism' that is undemocratic
is the more likely trajectory of the Australian welfare state in
the 1990s. The political form of this corporatism means there
is no obligation on business partners to comply with contractural agreements on state regulation of business. The business
sector might agree with some state policies but they are under
no obligation or duty to sustain a partnership with the state,
with groupings in the welfare sector or with unions. The power
structure of these relationships places business in the dominate
position beyond the control of the state and in control over
workers' rights such as the right to strike. This 'control from
above' brings with it the servitude of the workers to work and
defines their claims over work conditions as only existent within
the contractural agreements of corporatism.
Recent developments in Australian state welfare indicate
that increased targeting of beneficiaries will mean that greater
hostility amongst working class and poor people will eventuate towards state welfare activity. Governments cannot expect
these groups to vote for policies that support more generous
welfare measures unless they can be demonstrated to benefit
such citizens. More critical research on those who actually benefit from the contemporary social image of the welfare state has
lead the way in this regard (cf Papadakis 1990:b). Such research
will lay to rest the suggestion in social science that mass loyalty
is a homogenous factor in shaping government policies of social
reform in advanced welfare states. To understand congruence
between public opinion and state welfare activity further political explanation and empirical study is needed on the opinions of
select social groups that persuade governments to take action
on welfare policy. Just as all votes do not count equally, not
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all welfare consumers have an equal voice in the political and
policy arenas that orchestrate the distribution of state welfare
benefits.
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